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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case # 990294-CA
Priority # 2

v.
Jessie T. Wickham,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant was charged by Information with Contributing to
the Delinquency of a Minor, a Class B Misdemeanor. Defendant
appeared in the Seventh District Juvenile Court on this charge,
entered a plea of not guilty, and requested that a public
defender be appointed for his representation.

Defendant was

released on bail and failed to appear for trial and a bench
warrant was issued.

In January of 1999, the Defendant was picked

up on an outstanding warrant and this matter was set for trial.
Defendant was found guilty of Contributing to the Delinquency of
a Minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to serve 12 0
days in the Grand County Jail.
sentence.

The Defendant appeals from this

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this

matter pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 2 A - 3 ( E )
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(1953), as amended.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue 1. Did the Defendant
waive his Constitutional

right

knowingly and
to appointed

intelligently

counsel?

Standard of Review. Whether a waiver of counsel was made
knowingly and intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact
and is reviewed with some deference to the Trial Court.

State v.

Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932
(Utah 1994).
The issue of whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly
and intelligently does not require preservation at the Trial
Court for purposes of appeal.

Issue 2. Was the evidence
that Defendant

was guilty

sufficient

to support

beyond a reasonable

the

finding

doubt?

Standard of Review. Whether the evidence is sufficient is a
mixed question of fact and law reviewed with some deference to
the Trial Court.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) .

The issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support
the finding that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
does not require preservation at the Trial Court for purposes of
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about June 17, 1997, the Defendant was charged by
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Information with Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, a
Class B Misdemeanor.

(R002) On June 26, 1997, an arraignment was

held in Seventh District Juvenile Court on this charge. (R009)
Defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued with
bail in the amount of $1000.00. (R010, R014-015)
On July 10, 1997, a second arraignment hearing was held at
which Defendant appeared.

(R011)

The Defendant entered a plea

of not guilty and requested that a public defender be appointed
for his representation.

(R011) On July 10, 1997, Defendant was

released on bail and trial was set for September 23, 1997. (R012013)
The Defendant made contact with the Grand County Public
Defender, William L. Schultz, who served a discovery request in
the matter on the Grand County Attorney.

(R019)

On September

23, 1997, Defendant failed to appear for trial (R018) and a bench
warrant was issued with no bail. (R023)
In January of 1999, the Defendant was picked up on an
outstanding warrant, appeared before the Judge on February 3,
1999, and the matter was set for trial to commence on February
25, 1999.

(R025) Notice of the February 25, 1999, trial was sent

to William L. Schultz (R026) who moved to withdraw from the case
as he was no longer the Grand County Public Defender.

(R028) The

Court granted the motion (R02 9-03 0) but did not appoint or give
notice to the new Public Defender (counsel herein) about the
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Defendant's upcoming trial.
On February 25, 1999, Defendant, who was incarcerated, stood
trial without the assistance of an attorney.

(Tr. at p. 3) The

Court asked the Defendant if he was representing himself and the
Defendant responded, "I guess so." (Tr. at p. 3, lines 3-5)

The

Court then asked the Defendant if he still wished to proceed to
trial and the Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." (Tr. at p. 3,
lines 6-7)

The Court then proceeded to trial.

Officer Shawn Hansen was called by the prosecution.

(Tr. at

p. 3) He was examined and testified as to his roll in the
matter.(Tr. at pp. 3-6)

Officer Hansen stated that he was

dispatched on a disturbance call where he was advised individuals
were drinking beer in a parking lot. (Tr. at p. 4, lines 7-8)
Officer Hansen testified that the individual who called in the
disturbance stated that it was a red car that she was mainly
calling about and she pointed it out to Officer Hansen when he
arrived.

(Tr. at p. 4, lines 15-17)

Officer Hansen also

recognized a grey truck that was in the same parking lot and
testified that he knew it belonged to the Defendant. (Tr. at p.
4, lines 13-14)

Officer Hansen then made contact with the

Defendant and a passenger in the grey truck. (Tr. at pp. 4-5)
Officer Hansen testified that the Defendant was consuming
beer in the parked vehicle in that he had an open beer can and
there was also a beer can next to the passenger and numerous beer
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cans inside the truck.

(Tr. at p. 5, lines 3-5)

Officer

Hansen

then inquired as to the Defendant's age and the passenger's age
and found that Defendant was 21 years of age and the passenger
was 14 or 15 years of age. (Tr. at p. 5, lines 6-12)
Officer Hansen testified that both occupants of the truck
had alcoholic beverage on their breath and that the juvenile
tested .040 on the portable breath test.

(Tr. at p. 5-6)

Two

photographs of the beer cans in the car were then introduced
collectively as "Exhibit 1".

(Tr. at p. 6, line 9)

After the

results of the breath test, the juvenile informed Officer Hansen
that he had consumed one and one-half beers, but wouldn't tell
the officer where he had gotten them from. (Tr. at p. 6, lines 56,17-19).

The testimony Officer Hansen gave did not indicate

whether he questioned the juvenile as to when he had consumed the
one and one half beers or whether the juvenile said it wasn't
given to him by Defendant.
The Defendant did not cross-examine Officer Hansen and did
not call any witnesses or take the stand in his own behalf.
at p. 7, lines 5-12)

(Tr.

The Court found the Defendant guilty of

contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class B
Misdemeanor.

(R033-034, Tr. at p. 7) The Court inquired of the

Grand County prosecutor and the Defendant as to their individual
positions with regard to sentencing.

(Tr. at pp. 7-8) The state

recommended a sentence of 90 days in jail; however, the Court
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ordered the Defendant to serve 12 0 days in the Grand County Jail
and pay $500 within two months of being released from jail. (Tr.
at p. 7-9)
Following sentencing, the Defendant inquired of the Judge as
to a possibility for a retrial and the Court-appointed counsel he
was supposed to have representing him.
24)

(Tr. at p. 9, lines 21-

The Court informed the Defendant that he had waived his

right to a new trial at the beginning when he stated that he
would proceed without counsel.

(Tr. at p. 10, lines 1-3)

Current counsel was appointed to represent the Defendant on
or about March 29, 1999, (R040-044) after the Defendant filed a
pro

se Notice of Appeal (R03 5) regarding the aforementioned

decision of the Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel in the trial held on the charges of
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor.

The Utah Supreme

Court in State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917-918 (Utah 1998)
instructs Trial Courts in this regard as follows:
. . .before the court may permit the defendant to
proceed without the assistance of counsel, the court
must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to
fulfill its duty of insuring that the defendant's
waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made. In making this determination, the
court must advise the defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation "so that the
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing
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and his choice is made with eyes open. ' " Faretta,
422
U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United
States
ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236,
87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)); see Von Moltke
v. Gillies,
332
U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948);
State
v. Frampton,
737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987).
In addition, the trial court should (1) advise the
defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to
represent himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand
and appreciate the consequences of the decision to
represent himself, including the expectation that the
defendant will comply with technical rules and the
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a
matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that
the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and
any additional facts essential to a broad understanding
of the case. See State
v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 617
A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see also Frampton,
737 P.2d
at 187-88. (FN5)
At the beginning of the trial, the Court made an inadequate
inquiry of the defendant regarding his desire to proceed without
the assistance of counsel.

The inquiry lacked the necessary

components as listed above to allow the Court to make the
determination as to whether Defendant "knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily" waived his right to counsel.

The Court failed

to inform the Defendant of his sixth amendment rights and,
therefore, violated them.

Under Heaton. Defendant is entitled to

a new trial.
In addition, insufficient evidence was presented to warrant
a finding of guilty.

No testimony was offered nor evidence

presented to the Trial Court that showed that Defendant
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solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally
aided, or acted with the minor involved to violate a specific
state, federal, or local law. (Tr. at pp. 3-10)

This being the

definition of the charge of Contributing to the Delinquency of a
Minor, Defendant should have been found not guilty.

If the

findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, the
Defendant is entitled to have the verdict set aside by this
Court. State v. Strieby. 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990).
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED.
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998) sets forth
the following:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 34244, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.ed.2d, 799 (1963); Johnson
v.
Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.
1461 (1938). . .
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right
which must be jealously protected by the trial court.
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
The constitutional right of an accused to be
represented by counsel invokes, of itself the
protection of a trial court, in which the
accused--whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel. . . Johnson,
3 04 U.S. at
465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (emphasis added).
In the hearing held July 10, 1997, the Defendant appeared
for an arraignment hearing and requested the appointment of
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counsel.

(R011) A Trial date of September 23, 1997, was set.

The Defendant failed to appear at said trial and a bench warrant
was issued (R018).
In January of 1999, the Defendant was picked up on the
warrant and the previous public defender moved to withdraw on the
basis that he no longer was the contract public defender in Grand
County (R028). The Court failed to appoint or give notice to the
new contract public defender prior to the Defendant's trial.
(R040-044) The Court allowed the Defendant to represent himself
even though the Defendant had previously requested the assistance
of counsel and was only without counsel due to the Court's
failure to appoint the new public defender after granting
Defendant's previous public defender's motion to withdraw. (R018,
Tr. at p. 3)
The Court did not "jealously protect" the Defendant's right
to the assistance of counsel.

Heaton at 917.

If it had, it

would have recognized the fact that Defendant had been
represented by Court-appointed counsel previously in the same
matter and at the

very

least

would have inquired as to why

counsel was not present at the trial.

Not only did the Trial

Court fail to make such an inquiry, but additionally allowed the
client to represent himself after he had previously requested
Court-appointed counsel in the same matter.

The Trial Court

failed to "jealously protect" the Defendant's sixth amendment
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rights and, as a result, violated them. Id.

As such, Defendant

is entitled to a new trial.
II. DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917-918 (Utah 1998) states
the following:
. . .before the court may permit the defendant to
proceed without the assistance of counsel, the court
must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to
fulfill its duty of insuring that the defendant's
waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made. In making this determination, the
court must advise the defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation "so that the
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing
and his choice is made with eyes open.' " Faretta, 422
U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v.
United
States
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236,
87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)); see Von Moltke
v. Gillies,
332
U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948);
State
v. Frampton,
737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987).
In addition, the trial court should (1) advise the
defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to
represent himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand
and appreciate the consequences of the decision to
represent himself, including the expectation that the
defendant will comply with technical rules and the
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a
matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that
the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and
any additional facts essential to a broad understanding
of the case. See State
v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 617
A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see also Frampton,
737 P.2d
at 187-88. (FN5)
The record in this matter shows that the colloquy as
indicated above never occurred in the instant case between
-10-

Defendant and the Court prior to the Court allowing Defendant to
proceed without the assistance of counsel.

The entire dialogue

regarding this issue consisted of the following:
THE COURT: We're here for trial on contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. Mr. Wickham, are you
representing yourself?
MR. WICKHAM: I guess so.
THE COURT: Do you still wish to proceed to trial?
MR. WICKHAM: Yes, sir.
(Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7)
A.

THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE DANGERS
AND DISADVANTAGES OF SELF - REPRESENTATION .

First, the Court was required to conduct a thorough inquiry
of the Defendant by advising the Defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation.

It is apparent that the

simplistic colloquy at the beginning of the trial failed to
include this essential element (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7).
In Heaton, the facts surrounding this issue are quite
similar.

The Defendant did not want to proceed with his Court-

appointed counsel and had requested new counsel be appointed to
represent him.

The Judge advised Heaton of his right to self-

representation, refused to permit Heatonfs attorney to withdraw,
indicated to Heaton that he was requiring counsel to remain as
standby counsel to assist Heaton if he wanted the assistance, and
indicated that Heaton was free to choose to handle trial matters
on his own but that the Court would make a record of Heaton's
decision to proceed pro se. Id. at 914.
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On the first day of trial after the jury had been selected,
the Court "strongly advised Heaton to allow defense counsel to
cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch as Heaton would
certainly not be as effective as defense counsel."

Id. at 919.

The Utah Supreme Court did recognize this advice as appropriate,
but determined that it was only one of the disadvantages of selfrepresentation--i.e. not having experience and expertise at
cross-examining witnesses.

Id.

In Mr. Wickham's case, the Judge chose to give Mr. Wickham
advice after the trial regarding the notion that his waiver of
counsel at the beginning of trial adversely affected his right to
a new trial.

This advice--even if considered as appropriate as

the advice given in Heaton--nonetheless, was still only advising
the Defendant of one of the disadvantages of self-representation.
The Utah Supreme Court also recognized that the advice given
in Heaton, though appropriate, was given after
supposed waiver of counsel.

the Defendant's

As the Utah Supreme Court concluded,

". . .before a trial court may permit a Defendant to proceed pro
se, the Court must determine whether the Defendant competently
waived counsel at the time of waiver, not after."

Id. at 919.

While the Judge's advice in Mr. Wickham's case may be
considered "advising defendant of dangers and disadvantages" as
Heaton requires, the Judge did not advise the Defendant until
after the trial when it was too late for the Defendant to be able
-12-

to utilize that information in making the determination to
represent himself. (Tr. at pp. 9-10)
B.

THE COURT FAILED TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

After having informed the Defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, the Court is to next
"advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to
represent himself."

State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah

1998) sets forth the following with regard to the importance of
this requirement:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 34244, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.ed.2d, 799 (1963); Johnson
v.
Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.
1461 (1938). . .However, the Sixth Amendment also
guarantees an accused the right to self-representation,
"provided only that he [or she] knowingly and
intelligently forgoes his [or her] right to counsel."
McKaskle
v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S.Ct. 944,

79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984); see also

Faretta

v.

California,

422 U.S. 806, 807, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562
(1975).
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right
which must be jealously protected by the trial court.
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
The constitutional right of an accused to be
represented by counsel invokes, of itself the
protection of a trial court, in which the
accused--whose life or liberty is at stake--

is without counsel.
imposes the serious
responsibility
upon
determining whether

This protecting
dutyand weighty
the trial judge of
there is an
intelligent
-13-

and competent

waiver

by the

accused.

Johnson,
304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019
(emphasis added).
As is evidenced by the simplistic colloquy preceding the
trial (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7), the Court failed to properly
advise the Defendant of his sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel as well as his right to represent himself
prior to proceeding with the trial.
C.

THE COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE DEFENDANT
POSSESSED THE INTELLIGENCE AND CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND
THE CONSEQUENCES.

The next step the Court should take in determining that the
Defendant is knowingly and intelligently making a waiver of
counsel is for the Judge to "ascertain that the defendant
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and
appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself,
including the expectation that the Defendant will comply with
technical rules and the recognition that presenting a defense is
not just a matter of telling one's story." State v. Heaton, 958
P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 19 98). As Heaton states, the Judge must be
able to determine that the Defendant has the "intelligence and
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences."

For an

appellate Court to determine whether this has occurred, a
colloquy on the record is the preferred method of determining the
validity of the waiver. State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187-88
(Utah 1987).

Frampton set forth the following reasoning behind
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this conclusion:
. . .a colloquy on the record between the court and the
accused is the preferred method of ascertaining the
validity of a waiver because it insures that [the
defendant] understand[s] the risks of selfrepresentation. . .Even absent such a colloquy,
however, this Court will look at any evidence in the
record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of
the risks of proceeding pro se.
Id. at 188.
Again, as can be ascertained by the simplistic colloquy
found on the record at the beginning of the trial in this matter,
this essential element is also missing. (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7)
It is a far stretch to believe that anyone could ascertain the
intelligence or capacity of an individual who simply states "I
guess so" and "Yes, sir."

In fact, it could be assumed that the

Defendant obviously didn't understand or appreciate the
consequences when he inquired of the Judge as to a retrial on the
matter.
D.

(Tr. at p. 9, lines 21-22)
THE COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE DEFENDANT
POSSESSED THE INTELLIGENCE AND CAPACITY TO COMPLY WITH
TECHNICAL RULES.

As for compliance with the technical rules, the Judge failed
to communicate any expectations to the Defendant with regard to
his representation of himself. (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7)
Additionally, it could be ascertained that the Defendant was not
aware of the technical rules or the methods on presenting his own
defense by the fact that he did not cross-examine the witness
that was called nor did he call any witnesses or take the stand
-15-

on his own behalf. (Tr. at p. 7, lines 5-12)
E. THE COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE DEFENDANT
COMPREHENDED THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES AND PROCEEDINGS, THE
RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE PUNISHMENTS, AND ANY ADDITIONAL FACTS
ESSENTIAL TO A BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF THE CASE.
With regard to obtaining a valid waiver of counsel, the
appellate Court in State v. Heaton, 958 P. 2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998)
instructs the Trial Court as follows:
. . . the court must advise
the defendant
of the
dangers
and disadvantages
of self-representation
"so that
the
record will establish
that 'he knows what he is
doing
and his choice is made with eyes open. ' " Faretta,
422
U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v.
United
States
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236,
87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)); see Von Moltke
v. Gillies,
332
U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948);
State
v. Frampton,
737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987).
. . .the trial court should . . .(3) ascertain that the
defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and
any additional facts essential to a broad understanding
of the case. See State
v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 617
A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see also Frampton,
737 P.2d
at 187-88. (FN5)
(Emphasis

added).

The entire colloquy on the record in this matter occurring
between the Court and the Defendant is as follows:
THE COURT: We're here for trial on contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. Mr. Wickham, are you
representing yourself?
MR. WICKHAM: I guess so.
THE COURT: Do you still wish to proceed to trial?
MR. WICKHAM: Yes, sir.
A look once a g a i n a t t h i s s i m p l i s t i c c o l l o q u y ,
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which

occurred at the beginning of the trial, shows that no inquiries
were made by the Judge to ascertain the Defendant's comprehension
of the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of
permissible punishments, or any additional facts essential to a
broad understanding of the case. (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7)
For the Court to establish that the defendant "knows what he
is doing" and is making his choice "with eyes open," it is
necessary for the Court to make a thorough inquiry as to whether
the defendant has such a comprehension. Id. at 918.

The Court

simply stated the charges and that the matter was set for trial
that day.

The Judge then asked the Defendant if he would like to

proceed without counsel.

The Judge failed to simply inquire even

as to whether the Defendant comprehended what he had stated.
simple

A

l}

Do you understand what I have just told you?" could have

aided the Judge in making a proper determination as to whether
the Defendant comprehended what was occurring.

The Court had

adequate information and time to obtain a valid waiver by making
the appropriate inquiries of the Defendant, but failed to do so.
Without knowledge of the Defendant's comprehension of the
proceedings or the charges, it is impossible for anyone to
ascertain that he could have "intelligently" waive his right to
counsel.
F.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.

After a thorough inquiry into the record in this matter, it
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is apparent that the Defendant did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to be represented by counsel at a
trial on the charges.

In Heaton, after making the determination

that a valid waiver had not been obtained by the Trial Court, the
Utah Supreme Court held that because the Trial Court failed to
advise Heaton, at a minimum, of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, Heaton did not validly waive his
constitutional right to counsel.

Id. at 919. Based upon this

finding, they held that the Trial Court erred in permitting
Heaton to proceed pro se and Heaton was granted a new trial. Id.
at 919.

Mr. Wickham, too, was never advised, at a minimum, of

the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and
therefore did not validly waive his constitutional right to
counsel.

As with Heaton, Mr. Wickham, too, is entitled to a new

trial on the matter.
III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COURT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT
FOR A FINDING OF GUILT.
State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966 (Utah App. 1998) states the
following:
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged,
appellate Court reviews evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in light most
favorable to verdict or jury, and will reverse jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only when
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed
crime of which he was convicted.
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State in Interest of K.K.H., 610 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah 1980),
sets forth that the foregoing rule is the same whether a judge or
jury sits as the fact-finder.

State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799, 803

(Utah 1977) clarifies what is meant by "reasonable doubt" as
follows:
A reasonable doubt is not a mere imaginary captious, or
a possible doubt, but a fair doubt, based upon reason
and common sense, and growing out of the testimony of
the case. It is such a doubt as will leave the juror's
mind, after careful examination of all the evidence, in
such condition that he cannot say that he has an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
defendant's guilt.
In Mr. Wickham's case, one witness was called against him
and one exhibit was presented to the Court.

(Tr. at pp. 3-10)

The witness was a police officer who approached Mr. Wickham's
parked vehicle and testified to having observed several
containers of beer in the vehicle.

The officer did not testify

as to whether he saw the juvenile drinking at the time he
approached the vehicle, nor did he testify as to whether he
inquired of the juvenile regarding when the juvenile had consumed
the one and one-half beers.

The exhibit consisted of two

photographs of the beer in the vehicle.

This was the only

evidence presented by the State.
The officer testified that he inquired as to the ages of the
passengers and then administered a breath test to the juvenile,
who was 14 or 15 years of age, after smelling alcohol on the
juvenile's breath.

A portable breath test on the juvenile
-19-

registered as 0.40.

The juvenile, who originally denied having

drank any alcohol changed his story and informed the police
officer that he had drank one and one-half beers; however, as the
officer testified, the juvenile refused to tell the officer who
gave him the alcohol. (Tr. at p. 6, lines 5-6, 17-20)

Again, the

officer did not testify as to whether he saw the juvenile
drinking at the time he approached the vehicle, nor did he
testify as to whether he inquired of the juvenile regarding when
the juvenile had consumed the one and one-half beers.
The juvenile was not called as a witness and did not
volunteer information to the officer as to who provided him with
the alcohol that he had previously drank. (Tr. at p. 6, lines 56, 17-20) There was no testimony offered or evidence presented to
indicate that Mr. Wickham had any involvement in the juvenile's
delinquent behavior. (Tr. at pp. 3-10)
Given the testimony and evidence presented, the Court
concluded that "without a reasonable doubt, Mr. Wickham provided
the alcoholic beverages to [the minor],. . ." (Tr. at p. 7, lines
13-16) and therefore was guilty of contributing to the
delinquency of said minor; however, given the inconclusive
testimony and evidence presented, it is difficult to see how a
"reasonable person" could not maintain "a fair doubt" regarding
Mr. Wickham's alleged guilt.
Any person could have previously provided the minor with the
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one and one-half beers that the minor informed the officer he had
consumed.

The officer himself testified that the juvenile

refused to offer that information to him (Tr. at p. 6, lines 1720); therefore, there was no information received regarding who
contributed to the delinquency of this minor.

A reading on the

portable breath test of 0.4 0 is low enough that it could have
been from consuming the alcohol hours earlier in the day.

Based

upon reason and common sense, and growing out of the testimony
and evidence offered to the Court in this case, any "reasonable
person" would have "a fair doubt" regarding Mr. Wickham's alleged
guilt in the matter.
Simply having alcohol present with a minor who is not
drinking it is not contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

A

minor having admitted to drinking one and one-half beers at some
point during that day and then being in the presence of an adult
does not make that adult guilty of contributing to the
delinquency of that minor.

As set forth in 1999 WL 93222, State

v. Krueger, (Utah App. 1999), an interpretation of the language
of

UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 3 A - 8 0 1

(1) (A) (I) provides for "the prosecution

of a person 18 or older who solicits,
encourages,

or intentionally aids,

requests,

commands,

or acts with a minor to

violate a specific state, federal, or local law."
added)

(emphasis

Krueger relies upon the analysis made by the Utah Supreme

Court in State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (Utah
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1970)where it states the following with regard to the words
"delinquency" and "contributing to the delinquency":
. . .it denotes actions that will aid, encourage or
involve children in conduct which is contrary to law,
or which is so contrary to the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality that its result will
be substantially harmful to the mental, moral or
physical well-being of the child.
No testimony was offered nor evidence presented to the Trial
Court that showed that Mr. Wickham solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided, or acted with the
minor involved to violate a specific state, federal, or local
law.

(Tr. at pp. 3-10)

In Krueger, the Court found that

encouraging minors to even "remain delinquent" is sufficient for
a finding that an adult contributed to that minor's delinquent
behavior; however, no testimony or evidence was offered that Mr.
Wickham even knew about the minor's delinquent behavior, nor that
he supported or encouraged the minor to remain delinquent. (Tr.
at pp. 3-10) The only testimony and evidence offered showed that
Mr. Wickham had alcohol in the presence of a minor who was not
drinking it, all of which conclusively is not statutorily
considered contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

If such

behavior were to be considered contributing to the delinquency of
a minor, individuals who simply kept alcohol in their home where
their children reside would be guilty of such a crime.
Possession of alcohol in the presence of minors does not
make one guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor
-22-

unless that adult "aids, encourages or involves children in
conduct which is contrary to law, or which is so contrary to the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality that its
result will be substantially harmful to the mental, moral or
physical well-being of the child."

The State failed to prove

these actions occurred on Mr. Wickham's part or that Mr. Wickham
maintained any intent necessary with regard to the delinquent
behavior of the minor involved in this matter.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant respectfully
requests that this Court enter an order reversing the Trial
Court's decision; or in the alternative, remand the matter to the
Trial Court for a new trial to be held in the matter.
DATED THIS

0>£k day of August, 1999.

^w

y. j bus,

H^ppy J . Morgan
Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that on this the
day of August, 1999,
I caused to be served two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief by first-class postage pre-paid mail
to the following:
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

-24-

Addendum ~I~

FILED
MAR 0 2 1999
SEVbNTHDlSrR/CT
^VENJLE COuRT

SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTES, ORDER AND
DECREE

Plaintiff
vs

Case No.: 934947

JESSIE T. WICKHAM
Defendant
Tape:

J99-4 VIDEO Counter:

14:30

Court is in Session:

February 25, 1999

Type & Charge:

#001-Contributing to Delinquency

Present:

Jessie T. Wickham, defendant, William L. Benge, County Attorney, Robynn
Parker, DYC, Clark Messick, Bailiff; Pamela A. Bridwell, Clerk; S. Don
LeBaron, Judge.

This matter came before the Court for trial.
The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules
and Procedures.
The State calls Shawn Hansen who is sworn and examined. State introduced exhibit #12 pictures of alcohol. There being no objection same is received. The State rests their case.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Incident #001 is found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the evidence
presented to the Court. Further, that said defendant comes within the provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act.
The County Attorney recommends a sentence of 90 days to be served consecutive to
anytime defendant is now serving. No recommendation as to fine.
NOW THEREFORE AS DISPOSITION FOR INCIDENT #001-CONTRIBUTING
TO THE DELINQUENCY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
THAT:
Defendant is committed to Grand County Jail to serve 120 days. Time is to be served
consecutive to any time being served on prior court orders.

MINUTES, ORDER AND DECREE
DATE:
FEBRUARY 25,1999
CASE NAME AND NUMBER:
JESSIE T. WICKHAM-934947
PAGE 2

That defendant pay a fine plus surcharge of $500.00 with payment due within 2 months
of his release from jail. Payments are to be made to the Seventh District Juvenile Court, 125 East
Center, Moab, Utah, 84532.
Failure to comply with the order of this Court may result in your being found in contempt,
loss of driver's license, forfeiture of income tax refund and could result in additional penalties and/or
a commitment to jail.
You have the right to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Appeals must be filed within
30 days.
Dated this 25th day of February, 1999..
&

^ 4 " ^¥,THE COURT:

^•\;,7-::

;

'*" S. Don LeBaron, Judge

Copies mailed/hand delivered/faxed this jf£__73ay of February, 1999, to:
4 S f

••••••'

' • • - .

William L. Benge, County Attorney, 125 East Center, J<loab? Utah, 84532 \
Jessie T. WJckham in care of the Grand County Jail ft * f :<?-> ; -

Deputy Court Clerk

' '.

A
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958 P.2d 911, State v. Heaton, (Utah 1998)
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958 P.2d 911

342 Utah Adv. Rep. 19
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
John M. HEATON/ Defendant and Appellant.
No. 950238.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1998.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Ogden
Department, Michael J. Glassman, J., of aggravated robbery and
evading arrest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Russon,
J., held that: (1) burden of complying with the detainer statute
was on the prosecutor, not the defendant; (2) delay occasioned by
court clerk's error did not constitute good cause for delay under
detainer statute; (3) extending trial date to a reasonable time
outside detainer statute's 120-day disposition period to
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constituted good
cause for the delay under the statute; and (4) defendant did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to
appointed counsel.
Reversed.
1.

CRIMINAL LAW kll34(3)
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110kll34
Scope and Extent in General
110kll34(3)
Questions considered in general.
Utah 1998.
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss under detainer statute
was reviewed for correctness, where decision was based on legal
conclusion that clerk's administrative mistake could excuse
prosecutor's duty to bring charges to trial within statutory time
limit. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(1, 3, 4 ) .
2.

CRIMINAL LAW k735
110
110XX
Trial
110XX(F)
Province of Court and Jury in General
110k733
Questions of Law or of Fact
110k735
Mixed questions of law and fact.
Utah 1998.
Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly and

intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact.
3.

CRIMINAL LAW kll34(3)
110
110XXIV
Review
H O X X I V ( L ) Scope of Review in General
110kll34
Scope and Extent in General
110kll34(3)
Questions considered in general.
Utah 1998.
Supreme Court reviews trial court's legal determinations for
correctness.
4.

EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k5 9
166
166II
Detainers
166k59
Time for trial.
Utah 1998.
Burden of complying with the detainer statute was on the
prosecutor, not the defendant, and thus, the defendant did not
have the responsibility to find out why his case had not been
sent for trial. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.
5.

EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k59
166
166II
Detainers
166k59
Time for trial.
Utah 1998.
Even though most of delay in bringing defendant to trial was
occasioned by court clerk's error, this did not constitute good
cause under detainer statute for delay since the prosecutor was
not relieved of its burden of complying with the statute.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(1, 3, 4 ) .
6.

EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k5 9
166
166II
Detainers
166k59
Time for trial.
Utah 1998.
When a prisoner delivers written notice pursuant to detainer
statute, prosecutor has affirmative duty to have defendant's
matter heard within statutory period; implicit in this duty is
duty to notify court that detainer notice has been filed and to
make good faith effort to comply with statute. U.C.A.1953, 7729-1(1, 3, 4) .
7.

EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k5 9
166
166II
Detainers
166k59
Time for trial.
Utah 1998.
Since the detainer statute places on the prosecutor alone the
burden of bringing case to trial within 120-day period, the
prosecutor's duty must be independent of the court's docketing
system. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.

8.

CRIMINAL LAW kll34(6)
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110kll34
Scope and Extent in General
110kll34(6)
Theory and grounds of decision in lower

court.
Utah 1998.
Even if lower court erred in its legal conclusions, Supreme
Court may affirm trial court's decision on any reasonable legal
basis, provided that any rationale for affirmance finds support
in the record.
9.

EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k5 9
166
166II
Detainers
166k59
Time for trial.
Utah 1998.
Deciding whether the district court properly denied
defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to detainer statute
requires two-step inquiry: first, Supreme Court must determine
when the 120-day period
commenced and when it expired, second,
if
trial was held outside the 120-day period, Supreme Court must
then determine whether good cause excused the delay. U.C.A.1953,
77-29-1.
10.

EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k59
166
166II
Detainers
166k59
Time for trial.
Utah 1998.
Detainer statute's 120-day disposition period must be extended
by amount of time during which prisoner himself creates delay.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.
11.

EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k59
166
166II
Detainers
166k59
Time for trial.
Utah 1998.
Extending trial date to a reasonable time outside detainer
statute's 120-day disposition period to accommodate,
in
part,
defense counsel's schedule constituted good cause for the delay
under the statute. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4 ) .
12.

cases>

CRIMINAL LAW k641.4(4)
110
110XX
Trial
110XX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
110k641.4
Waiver of Right to Counsel
110k641.4(4)
Validity and sufficiency, particular

[See headnote text below]
12.

CRIMINAL LAW k641.7(1)
110
110XX
Trial
110XX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
110k641.7
Affirmative Duties in Protection of Right
110k641.7(l)
In general; advice, preliminary inquiry
and appointment by court.
Utah 1998.
Defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
constitutional right to appointed counsel, even though court
refused to dismiss defense counsel, recommended that defendant
rely on counsel during voir dire and strongly advised that he
allow counsel to cross-examine state's witnesses, where trial
court failed to advise defendant, at a minimum, of dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, and had already allowed
defendant to proceed pro se when warnings involving defense
counsel were issued. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
13.

CRIMINAL LAW k641.4(1)
110
110XX
Trial
110XX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
110k641.4
Waiver of Right to Counsel
110k641.4(1)
In general; right to appear pro se.
Utah 1998.
Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused right to selfrepresentation, provided only that he knowingly and intelligently
forgoes his right to counsel. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
14.

CRIMINAL LAW k641.4(2)
110
110XX
Trial
110XX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
110k641.4
Waiver of Right to Counsel
110k641.4(2)
Capacity and requisites in general.
Utah 1998.
When a trial court is confronted with defendant who either
refuses to proceed to trial with appointed counsel or insists on
proceeding pro se, court must carefully consider defendant's
right to self-representation with his right to counsel. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.
15.

CRIMINAL *911 LAW k641.7(l)
110
110XX
Trial
110XX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
110k641.7
Affirmative Duties in Protection of Right

110k641.7(l)
In general; advice, preliminary inquiry
and appointment by court.
Utah 1998.
Before trial court may permit defendant to proceed without
assistance of counsel, court must conduct thorough inquiry of
defendant to fulfill its duty of insuring that defendant's waiver
of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; in
making this determination, the court must advise defendant of
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that the
record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
16.

CRIMINAL LAW k641.7(1)
110
110XX
Trial
110XX(B)
Course and Conduct of Trial in General
110k641
Counsel for Accused
110k641.7
Affirmative Duties in Protection of Right
110k641.7(1)
In general; advice, preliminary inquiry
and appointment by court.
Utah 1998.
In addition to advising defendant of dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation before permitting defendant to proceed
without assistance of counsel, trial court should (1) advise
defendant of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel,
as well as his constitutional right to represent himself, (2)
ascertain that defendant possesses intelligence and capacity to
understand and appreciate consequences of decision to represent
himself, including expectation that defendant will comply with
technical rules and recognition that presenting defense is not
just matter of telling one's story, and (3) ascertain that
defendant comprehends nature of charges and proceedings, range of
permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to
broad understanding of case. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
17.

CRIMINAL LAW kll39
110
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110kll3 9
Additional proofs and trial de novo.
Utah 1998.
In the absence of a colloquy on the record between the court
and the defendant determining the validity of a waiver of
counsel, Supreme Court will look at record and make de novo
determination regarding validity of defendant's waiver only in
extraordinary circumstances, the existence of which the Court
will address on a case-by-case basis. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
*912 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Kris Leonard, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Candace S. Bridgess, Kent E. Snider, Ogden, for defendant and
appellant.

RUSSON, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
Defendant John M. Heaton appeals a judgment entered on a jury
verdict finding him guilty of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, and evading arrest, a third degree felony. We reverse.
*913

BACKGROUND

Because some of the dates corresponding to the facts in this
case are critical to the resolution of this appeal, we provide a
detailed chronological summary of the relevant events.
On July 13, 1994, Heaton was arrested for the robbery of an
Albertson's grocery store in Roy, Utah. The next day, Heaton
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was bound over to
district court. Heaton was a parolee at the time, and on July
26, he was returned to the Utah State Prison for violating his
parole. Heaton also qualified for public assistance and was
appointed counsel from the public defender's office. On August
2, Heaton appeared in district court for arraignment, at which
time he pleaded "not guilty" to the charges and the judge set a
pretrial conference for August 3 0 and a jury trial for September
9. On August 25, while incarcerated at the prison, Heaton filed
a written request for final disposition of all matters pending
against him pursuant to Utah Code Ann. s 77-29-1 (the "detainer
statute"), which requires the prosecutor to bring pending charges
against a prisoner to trial within 120 days from the date the
notice is delivered to certain state officials or their agents.
An authorized agent at the prison received Heaton's notice on
September 3. (FN1)
At his pretrial conference on August 30, Heaton requested a
preliminary hearing, which he had initially waived. The
prosecution had no objection, and the parties and the court
agreed to hold a preliminary hearing on September 9, the date for
which the trial had initially been set. At the September 9
preliminary hearing, the court found that probable cause existed
and set a second arraignment for September 27. At the second
arraignment, Heaton requested that the judge recuse himself on
the basis that the judge had also presided over Heaton's
preliminary hearing. The judge recused himself and ordered the
case reassigned. However, as a result of an error in the
district court clerk's office, the case was not reassigned. In
late November 1994, after receiving inquiry by a witness
regarding the trial date, the prosecutor contacted the district
court for a status report, whereupon the clerk's office
discovered the error and reassigned the case to a different judge
as previously ordered.
On November 28, the district court sent the parties a notice
of a trial-scheduling conference set for December 7. At that

conference, the court initially attempted to set the trial date
for January 19, 1995. However, because both defense counsel and
the prosecutor had a scheduling conflict, the court set the trial
for the next available date suitable for all the parties,
February 16 and 17, 1995. (FN2)
Subsequent to the trial-scheduling conference on December 7,
1994, Heaton sent a letter to the court requesting new counsel.
On February 8, 1995, the court held a hearing to address Heaton's
request, which was based in part on his defense counsel's refusal
to bring a motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute.
The court denied Heaton's request. On February 16, 1995, after
reevaluating Heaton's claim, Heaton's defense counsel moved to
dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute. The court, however,
found that at least 60 days of the 71-day delay--i.e., the period
between the second arraignment and the trial-scheduling
conference--were attributable to the administrative error in the
clerk's office. This delay, the court concluded, constituted
"good cause" under the statute, and the court therefore denied
the motion.
Although originally scheduled for February 16 and 17, 1995,
the trial was not actually held until April 20 and 21, 1995.
(FN3) Before trial, Heaton filed a pro se motion requesting that
the judge recuse himself and requesting new counsel. A hearing
was held on April 19, 1995, and the judge denied both requests.
During the hearing, Heaton indicated that he did not feel he
was receiving adequate legal representation and that he felt
forced to *914 proceed on his own. His attorney indicated that
a "rift" had developed between them, that he was uncomfortable
going to trial because of the "total conflict" between them, and
that he thought Heaton wanted to represent himself. Heaton did
not assert his right to self-representation, and the judge did
not ask Heaton whether he wished to waive his right to counsel.
Instead, the judge (1) advised Heaton of his right to selfrepresentation, (2) refused to permit Heaton's counsel to
withdraw, (3) indicated to Heaton that he was requiring counsel
to remain as standby counsel to assist Heaton if he wanted the
assistance, and (4) indicated that Heaton was free to choose to
handle trial matters on his own but that the court would make a
record of Heaton's decision to proceed pro se.
Although Heaton's defense counsel assisted Heaton in selecting
the jury, Heaton represented himself at trial. The jury
convicted Heaton on both charges, and he was sentenced to serve
concurrent terms of five years to life and zero to five years at
the Utah State Prison, such terms to be served consecutively to
any sentences Heaton was already serving.
On appeal, Heaton alleges the following errors: (1) the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the
detainer statute; (2) he was denied his constitutional right to

counsel; (3) he was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel; and (4) the prosecutor's misconduct
during closing argument constituted reversible error.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] The trial court's decision to deny Heaton's motion to
dismiss v/as based on its legal conclusion that under the detainer
statute the clerk's administrative mistake could excuse the
prosecutor's duty to bring Heaton's charges to trial within the
12 0-day period. Because this is a legal, rather than a factual,
conclusion, we review the trial court's decision for correctness.
See State
v. Petersen,
810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991).
[2] [3] Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly and
intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact. We review the
trial court's legal determinations for correctness. See State
v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-39 (Utah 1994); Harding
v. Lewis,
834
F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir.1987).
ANALYSIS
[4] Heaton first argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute. That
statute provides, in relevant part:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional
institution of this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of
the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge
and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition
of the pending charge, he shall be entitled
to have the
charge
brought
to trial
within
120 days of the date of delivery
of
written
notice.

(3) After written demand is delivered as required in

Subsection (1), the prosecuting
attorney
or the defendant
or
his counsel,
for good cause shown in open court,
with the
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted
any
reasonable
continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within
120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the

court shall review the proceeding. If
the failure
of the prosecuting
attorney

the court finds
that
to have the
matter

heard within
the time required
is not supported
by good
cause,
whether
a previous
motion
for continuance
was made or not,
the
court
shall
order the matter
dismissed
with
prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. s 77-29-1(1), (3), & (4) (emphasis added).
In denying Heaton's motion to dismiss, the district court made
the following ruling:
[T]his Court is going to deny the Defendant's [motion on] the
basis that I believe
*915 that there has been good cause [.] And that term
doesn't quite fit in this situation, but explainable cause
shown as to why the delay occurred. And the Court does not
find in any way that it was as a result of the
prosecution's dragging its feet.

The facts are that the bulk of the delay, 60 days at least
of it, was the fault probably of the Clerk's office in this
case. And again I don't know whether that fits into what
could be called a good cause shown, but the Court believes
that it happens from time to time, that there can be that kind
of a glitch.
And certainly the Defendant could have pushed to find out
why his case had not been set for trial. [He] [c]ould have
pushed his counsel to make that request, [a]nd was in the same
position [as was] the State....
The case sat. And it is unfortunate it did, but the Court
will deny the motion at this time.
The district court's ruling contradicts section 77-29-1 and
our prior case law. The statute requires the prosecutor "to have
the matter heard within the time required." Utah Code Ann. s 7729-1(4). Moreover, this court has consistently held that the
language of the detainer statute clearly places the burden of
complying with the statute on the prosecutor. See Petersen,
810
P.2d at 424; State
v. Wilson,
22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158, 160
(1969). In Petersen,
the trial court asked the defendant whether
the trial date was acceptable, and the defendant did not object
to the date, which was outside the 12 0-day period. Nevertheless,
this court concluded that the defendant was not required to
object to the trial date in order to maintain his rights under
the statute because the burden of bringing the case to trial
within the disposition period rested solely with the prosecution.
810 P.2d at 424.
Thus, in the case at bar, the court clearly
erred in concluding that Heaton was in the same position as was
the State and therefore shared some of the responsibility to find
out why his case had not been set for trial.

[5] The trial court further erred in its legal conclusion that
the 71-day delay, most of which was occasioned by the court
clerk's error, constituted "good cause" and thereby relieved the
prosecutor of its burden under the statute. We first note that
the judge's finding that the State did not contribute to the
delay carries little significance. The mere fact that the delay
was not caused by the prosecutor has never been considered
dispositive because "to hold that good cause is supported by the
lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would
contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) which places the
burden of complying with the statute on the prosecution." Id. at
426; see also Wilson,
453 P.2d at 159-60 (reversing trial
court's decision not to dismiss, notwithstanding fact that
prosecution did not cause delay).
[6] [7] The State argues that while it could have followed up
on the case earlier, "defendant cites no precedent for
attributing to the prosecutor the responsibility for anticipating
or preventing unexpected and infrequent administrative mistakes
made by court personnel."
We agree with the State that it is
not responsible for the administrative mistakes of the court.
Nevertheless, it is responsible for complying with section 77-291. Because the statute places on the prosecutor alone the burden
of bringing the case to trial within the 120-day period, the
prosecutor's duty must be independent of the court's docketing
system. While Heaton's case fell victim to an administrative
"glitch" at the clerk's office, his case also fell through a
crack in the prosecutor's office. Even though the prosecutor's
office received Heaton's detainer notice on September 8, 1994,
neither the briefs nor our review of the record indicates that
the prosecutor even addressed Heaton's detainer notice to the
court until February 16, 1995, after the disposition period had
already expired. When a prisoner delivers a written notice
pursuant to the detainer statute, the prosecutor has an
affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard within the
statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify
the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a
good faith effort to comply with the statute. This is not to say
that the prosecutor must succeed, for "good cause" may support
the prosecutor's *916 failure to comply. However, where the
prosecutor's failure is inaction--in this case, doing nothing
whatsoever to bring Heaton's case to trial within the statutory
period--the trial court may not conclude that the prosecutor's
failure is supported by "good cause."
[8] [9] Nevertheless, even if the lower court erred in its
legal conclusions, this court may affirm a trial court's decision
on any reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for
affirmance finds support in the record. See K & T, Inc.
v.
Koroulis,
888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994); Hill
v. Seattle
First
Nat'l
Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). Deciding whether the
district court properly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss

pursuant to the detainer statute requires a two-step inquiry.
First, we must determine when the 12 0-day period commenced and
when it expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120day period, we must then determine whether "good cause" excused
the delay.
[10] The detainer statute clearly provides that the 120-day
period commences on the date the written notice is delivered "to
the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any
appropriate agent of the same." Utah Code Ann. s 77-29-1(1);
see also State
v. Viles,
702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) (holding
that 120-day disposition period commences from date of delivery
of written notice to warden, not from date defense counsel files
notice of appearance). However, this court has held that when a
prisoner himself acts to delay the trial, he indicates his
willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial.
Thus, the disposition period must be extended by the amount of
time during which the prisoner himself creates the delay. See
State
v. Velasquez,
641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982) (concluding
that where defendant's trial date was originally scheduled less
than one month after defendant's request for disposition and
court granted defendant's request for continuance, defendant was
responsible for number of days during which continuance was
granted and could not include those days in disposition period).
In the case at bar, the 120-day disposition period commenced
on September 3, 1994, because that is the date on which an
authorized agent at the prison received Heaton's written notice.
However, Heaton did cause a trial delay. As set forth above, the
court initially scheduled trial for September 9, 1994. At his
pretrial conference on August 30, Heaton requested a preliminary
hearing, which he had initially waived. The prosecutor having no
objection, the court granted Heaton's request, changing the trial
date to the preliminary hearing date. But for Heaton's request
for a preliminary hearing, his case would have been brought to
trial on September 9, just 6 days after his written notice had
been delivered. Thus, Heaton delayed his own trial and indicated
his willingness to temporarily waive his rights under the
detainer statute. See Velasquez,
641 P.2d at 116.
When the court changed Heaton's trial date to the preliminary
hearing date, in effect it continued Heaton's trial pending the
outcome of the preliminary hearing. Had the court not found
probable cause at the hearing, it would have had to dismiss the
charges. See Utah R.Crim.P. 7(h)(3). However, the court did
find probable cause and therefore scheduled a second arraignment
for September 27. The court could not set a new trial date until
Heaton entered his pleas at the second arraignment. Thus,
because Heaton's trial date was continued for the purpose of
accommodating his request for a preliminary hearing, and because
a new trial date could not even have been considered until the
second arraignment, Heaton may not include the 18 days between

September 9 and September 27 as part of the 120-day disposition
period.
Excluding the 18-day delay attributable to Heaton, the State
had until January 19, 1995, to bring Heaton to trial. Although
the court initially attempted to set the trial for January 19,
1995, it scheduled the trial beyond the disposition period
because of the defense counsel's and prosecutor's scheduling
conflict. Therefore, we must proceed to step two of our inquiry
to determine whether continuing the trial to accommodate, in
part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under
section 77-29-1.
*917 [11] A nearly identical issue was raised in State
v.
Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970), wherein the initially
scheduled trial date fell within the disposition period, but
because defense counsel had a scheduling conflict the court
rescheduled the trial for five days beyond the disposition
period. This court concluded that section 77-65-1, the
predecessor to section 77-29-1, (FN4) permitted the court to
grant " 'for a good cause shown in open court ... any necessary
or reasonable continuance.' " Bonny, 477 P.2d at 147-48 (quoting
Utah Code Ann. s 77-65-1). Thus, because the trial was
rescheduled at defense counsel's request and to accommodate his
schedule, this court held that the trial court had authority to
grant such a continuance, which was "entirely reasonable and
practical under the circumstances." Id. at 148.
Because section 77-29-1(3) contains substantially the same
language as section 77-65-1 and gives the court discretion to
grant continuances, the reasoning in Bonny is applicable to the
case at bar. The January 19, 1995, date initially offered by the
trial court fell within the 120-day disposition period, and the
court was therefore within its authority to grant a reasonable
continuance under section 77-29-1(3) to accommodate defense
counsel's schedule. In light of the other criminal trial both
defense counsel and the prosecutor were engaged in, setting
Heaton's trial one month beyond the disposition period was not
unreBasonable. Therefore, we hold that while the district court
erred in its legal conclusions, extending the trial date to a
reasonable time outside the disposition period to accommodate, in
part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under
section 77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court correctly denied
Heaton's motion to dismiss.
[12] [13] We next address Heaton's argument that he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to
appointed counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 342-44, 83
S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Johnson
v. Zerbst,
304 U.S.
458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). If an accused

is indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel. See
State
v. Wulffenstein,
733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986). However,
the Sixth Amendment also guarantees an accused the right to selfrepresentation, "provided only that he [or she] knowingly and
intelligently forgoes his [or her] right to counsel."
McKaskle
v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122
(1984); see also Faretta
v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 807, 818,
95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be
jealously protected by the trial court. The United States
Supreme Court has stated:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by
counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court,
in which the accused--whose life or liberty is at stake--is

without counsel. This protecting
duty imposes the serious and
weighty responsibility
upon the trial judge of
determining
whether there is an intelligent
and competent waiver by the
accused.
Johnson,
304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (emphasis added).
Because of the importance of the right to counsel and the heavy
burden placed upon the trial court to protect this right, there
is a presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver
must be resolved in the defendant's favor. See, e.g.,
Johnson,
304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (" ' [C]ourts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental
constitutional rights." (quoting Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Kennedy,
301
U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937)));
United
States
v. Williamson,
806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir.1986) (doubts
concerning waiver of counsel must be resolved in defendant's
favor).
[14] [15] [16] When a trial court is confronted with a
defendant who either refuses to proceed to trial with appointed
counsel or insists on proceeding pro se, the court must carefully
consider the defendant's right to self-representation with his
right to counsel. Nevertheless, before the court may permit the
*918 defendant to proceed without the assistance of counsel, the
court must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill
its duty of insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. In making this
determination, the court must advise the defendant of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the record will
establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open.' " Faretta,
422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525
(quoting Adams v. United States
ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)); see Von Moltke
v.

Gillies,
332 U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948);
State
v. Frampton,
737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987). In
addition, the trial court should (1) advise the defendant of his
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his
constitutional right to represent himself; (2) ascertain that
the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to
understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to
represent himself, including the expectation that the defendant
will comply with technical rules and the recognition that
presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story;
and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of
the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible
punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad
understanding of the case. See State
v. Frye,
224 Conn. 253, 617
A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see also Frampton,
131 P.2d at 18788. (FN5)
This court stated in Frampton that a colloquy on the record
between the court and the defendant is the preferred method of
determining the validity of a waiver of counsel. Frampton,
131
P.2d at 187.
The reasoning behind this conclusion is that the
information necessary for the court to make its determination
generally "can only be elicited after penetrating questioning by
the trial court." Id.;
see also Von Moltke,
332 U.S. at 724, 68
S.Ct. 316 ("A judge can make certain that an accused's professed
waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a
penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the
circumstances."). In Frampton,
we also stated that in the
absence of such a colloquy, we will look at any evidence in the
record to determine whether the particular facts and
circumstances support a valid waiver. 737 P.2d at 188.
[17] However, in light of the foregoing discussion, this court
is reluctant to assume the important responsibility which has
been placed upon the trial court. After all, the trial court-having the benefit of questioning the defendant and observing his
demeanor--is in the best position to determine whether the
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his
right to counsel. In contrast, this court's proper role is to
review the trial court's findings and conclusions and then
determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the
defendant validly waived counsel. A meaningful review of the
trial court can take place only after that court has conducted a
meaningful inquiry of the defendant. Therefore, in the absence
of such a colloquy, this court will look at the record and make a
de novo determination regarding the validity of the defendant's
waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, the existence of
which we will address on a case-by-case basis. See Harding,
834
F.2d at 857.
In the case at bar, the trial court clearly did not advise
Heaton of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

The day before trial, during the hearing addressing Heaton's
motion for new counsel, the trial judge stated:
Now, with respect to counsel, you do have the right to
represent yourself. I am not going to allow Mr. Caine's
withdrawal at this point. Mr. Caine is a capable defense
attorney. He is very familiar with the facts in your case. I
am going to require that he remain on as counsel to assist you
if you want the assistance.
*919
Mr. Heaton, if during the process of the Jury selection,
and the defense that you want to present during the trial, you
want to handle that on your own, you are free to do that. And
you will be making that decision as you go. We will make a
record of your decision to handle those matters on your own if
that's your choice.
My recommendation to you is that you rely on Mr. Caine's
expertise and experience and have him help you. But you can
make that choice.
The court's cursory recommendation to Heaton to rely on
defense counsel did not apprise Heaton in any way of the
constitutional significance of the right to counsel and the
consequences of waiver. The State argues that Heaton should have
been aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation because on the day of trial, after the jury had
been selected, the court strongly advised Heaton to allow defense
counsel to cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch as Heaton
would certainly not be as effective as defense counsel. While
the court's advice was certainly appropriate, it addressed only
one of the disadvantages of self-representation--!.e., not having
experience and expertise in cross-examining witnesses. Moreover,
the trial court had already determined that Heaton had decided to
represent himself. As we have previously mentioned, before a
trial court may permit a defendant to proceed pro se, the court
must determine whether the defendant competently waived counsel
at the time of waiver, not after.
We therefore hold that because the trial court failed to
advise Heaton, at a minimum, of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, Heaton did not validly waive his
constitutional right to counsel. The trial court erred in
permitting Heaton to proceed pro se, and Heaton is entitled to a
new trial. There are no extraordinary circumstances in this case
which would justify our examination of the record and making a de
novo determination as to whether Heaton knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel. Moreover, because the
waiver of counsel issue is dispositive of this appeal, we need
not address Heaton's other arguments.

We reverse Heaton's convictions and order a new trial.
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, Associate C.J., and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN,
JJ., concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion.
FN1. The prosecutor's office received the notice on September 8.
The record does not indicate whether the district court
received Heaton's detainer notice; however, the prosecutor
stated that he believed the court probably received the notice
on September 8, 1994.
FN2. Defense counsel and the prosecutor were working on another
criminal trial in mid-January.
FN3. The reasons for the trial delay from February to April are
not pertinent to this appeal.
FN4. Section 77-29-1, enacted in 1980, replaced section 77-65-1.
FN5. In Frampton,
as a guide for trial courts, this court quoted
a sixteen-point colloquy recommended to the federal courts for
use when confronting a prospective pro se defendant.
Frampton,
737 P.2d at 187-88 n. 12 (citing Bench Book for United States
District Court Judges, vol. 1, ss 1.02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial
Center, 3d ed. 1986)). Once again, we strongly recommend that
trial courts use that approach, as it is an effective means by
which to determine whether the defendant has validly waived his
right to counsel.

Addendum ~III~

78-3a-603

JUDICIAL CODE

(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the
Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any
authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is
an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges
in the district court.
199$
78-3a-603.

Certification h e a r i n g s — J u v e n i l e court to
hold preliminary h e a r i n g — Factors consid'
ered by j u v e n i l e court for w a i v e r of j u r i s d i c
tion to district court.
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78-3a-502(3) alleges the commission of an act which
would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the
juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing.
(2) At the preUminary hearing the state shall have the
burden of going forward with its case and the burden of
establishing:
(a) probable cause to believe t h a t a crime was committed and that the defendant committed it; and
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be
contrary to the best interests of the minor or of the public
for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction.
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the
best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile
court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider,
and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the
following factors:
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the
protection of the community requires isolation of the
minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the
minor in concert with two or more persons under circumstances which would s u b l e t t h e miiiOT to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult;
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or
property, greater weight being given to offenses against
persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418;
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, environment, emotional attitude,
and pattern of living;
(f) the record and previous history of the minor;
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use
of facilities available to the juvenile court;
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire
offense in one court when the minor's associates in the
alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a
crime in the district court;
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission
of an offense; and
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon
on or about school premises as provided in Section 76-IO
505.5.
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors
listed in Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court.
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the
m i n o r s mental, physical, educational, and social history
may be considered by the court.
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent,
guardian, or other interested party, the court shall require
the person or agency preparing the report and other
material to appear and be subject to both direct and
cross-examination.
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may
testify under oath, call witnesses, cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by
Subsection (3).
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under
Subsection (2), the court may enter an order:
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(a) certifying that finding; and
(b) directing t h a t the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court.
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court need not
include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b).
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-116, Section 78-3a-913
and other provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases
are applicable to the hearing held under this section to the
extent they are pertinent.
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal
proceedings in the district court is not entitled to a prelims
nary examination in the district court.
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district
court shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal
defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile
court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court
under this section or when a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a
committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division
of Youth Corrections and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other
offenses arising from the same criminal episode, and any
subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him,
except as provided in Subsection (14).
(13) A minor may be convicted under this section on the
charges filed or on any other offense arising out of the same
criminal episode.
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the
Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any
authority previously exercised over the minor when there is
an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges
in the district court.
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PART 8
ADULT OFFENSES
78-3a-801.

J u r i s d i c t i o n of adults for offenses against
m i n o r s — Proof of d e l i n q u e n c y not required
for c o n v i c t i o n .
(1) The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to try the
following adults for offenses committed against minors:
(a) any person 18 years of age or older who:
(i) solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids or who acts with a minor in the
violation of any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance;
(ii) tends to cause minors to become or remain
delinquent; or
(iii) aids, contributes to, or becomes responsible for
the neglect, abuse, or delinquency of any minor;
(b) any person 18 years or older, having a minor in his
legal custody, or under his care, or in his employment,
who willfully abuses or ill-treats, neglects, or abandons
the minor in any manner likely to cause the minor
unnecessary suffering or serious injury to his health or
morals;
(c) any person 18 years or older who:
(i) forcibly takes away a minor from, or wrongfully
encourages him to leave, the legal or physical custody
of any person, agency, or institution in which the
minor lawfully resides or has been legally placed for
the purpose of care, support, education, or adoption;
or

